Previous studies on biased intergroup perceptions of outgroups' irrationality mostly treated the target groups as opponents and rivals. In three studies, we extended this line of research and tested the hypothesis that individuals who challenge the existing social hierarchy exhibit more positive biases toward low-status outgroup members. We also hypothesized that when irrational thinking is framed as an important human trait, this bias is reduced among low social dominance orientation (SDO) individuals. In three studies (N = 169, N = 450, and N = 161), conducted in countries that vary in power distance levels (Poland, Spain, Sweden and Turkey), we examined under which conditions low-status outgroups are perceived as more rational than ingroup members. The results show that in a condition without irrationality framed as a human trait, psychology students (Study 1 and Study 2) and nonstudents low in group-based dominance orientation (Study 3) perceive outgroup members as less irrational than ingroup members. However, when participants were reminded that irrationality is a human trait, the perceived differences between in-and outgroup members were reduced. This effect was observed in all four countries (Study 1 and Study 2) and held when variables related to the tendency to behave in a socially desirable way were controlled for (Study 3).
Research related to the social dominance orientation showed that individuals with low SDO tend to exhibit less negative stereotypes toward disadvantaged groups and generally challenge hierarchical views on social relations. Individuals with high SDO are more likely to differentiate groups in terms of their ability, intelligence, incompetence, and stupidity (Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994) . This effect is especially pronounced when the ingroup has higher status than the outgroup (Jost & Thompson, 2000) . SDO manifested by an individual's preference for a group-based hierarchy (the Group-Based Dominance subscale) and inequality (the Opposition to Equality subscale; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Pratto et al., 2006) stands in opposition to the values of universalism and openness to egalitarianism (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010) . Individuals with low SDO are also less likely to express prejudice toward disadvantaged groups and support ideologies (or legitimizing myths) that maintain social inequality (Fischer, Hanke, & Sibley, 2012) , and are less likely to accept violent changes within democratic systems (Besta, Szulc, & Jaśkiewicz, 2015) .
The second line of research on which we base this investigation is related to an individual's position toward the status quo. For instance, challengers of the status quo tend to ascribe more irrationality to their opponents, compared to individuals who support the status quo (Bäck & Lindholm, 2014) . That is, focusing on challenging currently dominant beliefs and norms elicits the devaluation of rival outgroups' attitudes by ascribing less rationality to those outgroups (Bäck, 2013) . Moreover, this effect is independent of ideology (Bäck, 2013; Bäck & Lindholm, 2014) .
Previous studies on biased intergroup perceptions of outgroups' irrationality mostly treated the target groups as opponents and rivals (Bäck & Lindholm, 2014) . We extend this line of research and examine whether students of hierarchy-attenuating professions, which usually are more likely to challenge existing hierarchies, ascribe less irrationality to low-status outgroups. Considering positive attitudes toward marginalized groups and low-status individuals among hierarchy-attenuating people, we propose that individuals who challenge the existing social hierarchy could exhibit positive biases toward low-status outgroup members. That is, the goal of these studies is to verify whether low-status outgroups are perceived as more rational than ingroup members by individuals from groups that question and challenge existing social hierarchies (e.g., of hierarchy-attenuating likely majors such as social sciences students).
Thus, we predict that the automatic response of low SDO individuals is to reduce inequalities and social hierarchies, regardless of the cultural context that accepts o does not accept unequal distributions of power between individuals.
Challenging social hierarchies can be manifested in the social perception by attributing less negative traits (i.e., irrational thinking) to outgroup members, such as minority groups or more generally, low social status groups (compared to ingroup members as the high-status majority group).
because humans are not fully rational). Thus, when irrationality is presented as a core trait of being a truly human, the differences between the perceptions of the out-and ingroups will be lower among low SDO individuals.
Overview of the Three Studies
In three studies, we explored whether irrationality of behavior is attributed to a member of the ingroup or to a lowstatus outgroup. The first hypothesis (H1) is that low SDO individuals attribute more irrationality to an ingroup member than to an outgroup member, when the outgroup member belongs to a low-status group.
Studies have shown how the evaluation of outgroups is affected by student participants' study major (for discussion see e.g., Dambrun, Kamiejski, Haddadi, & Duarte, 2009) . As examples of low SDO individuals, we selected samples of psychology students. Psychology students compared to other students have been shown to be statistically significantly lower in SDO and thus, are considered a hierarchy-attenuating group (compared, e.g., to biology and law students; see Dambrun, Guimond, & Duarte, 2002; Dambrun et al., 2009; Guimond, 2000) . In addition, psychology students may have characteristics distinguishing them from students in other study areas and even show pro-outgroup biases, in contrast to students of hierarchy-enhancing power professions (e.g., biology, medical science, commerce, engineering, and law), whose views of outgroup members tend to be negative (Dambrun et al., 2009; Prescott & Logan, 2018; Rubinstein, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991) . For instance, compared to other study areas (including engineering, business, and health professions), psychology students score higher in humanism (Cummings, 2008) and lower in racism (Sidanius et al., 1991) .
Moreover, psychology students are less likely to have authoritarian personalities (Weller & Nadler, 1975) . Similarly, Rubinstein (2003) showed that individuals with authoritarian personalities are less likely to choose social sciences.
In addition, SDO correlates positively with conservative beliefs , and in the academic field of psychological science in the USA, registered Democrats (liberal views) outnumber Republicans (conservative views) by ratio of 16.8:1.0 (Langbert, 2018) . Therefore, it can be suggested that research conducted among psychology students can be influenced by their humanist, less authoritarian, and less hierarchy-enhancing attitudes compared to attitudes that are more common in other, more hierarchy-enhancing academic areas.
However, attributing rationality could be a way of dehumanizing individuals by viewing them as cold and weirdly unemotional (e.g., by representing them as objects or automata; Haslam, 2006) . To examine how core human characteristics are framed, we include a control condition: In Studies 1 and 2, we control for a possible dehumanization effect by adding a condition in which irrationality is framed as a natural, common human characteristic. As the context of the participants' responses should matter, if outgroup dehumanization is responsible for the proout-group effect, we assume that the attribution of irrationality is even stronger when the relation between being human and irrational is emphasized.
Overall, we assumed that a pro-low-status outgroup bias is not a result of dehumanization of outgroup members.
We assumed Hypothesis 2 (H2), that when irrational thinking is framed as an important human trait, this bias is reduced among low SDO individuals. In other words, we assumed a statistically significant main effect of group membership when no framing of irrationality is present, and a statistically significant interaction effect between the group status and framing, with outgroup members perceived as less irrational by psychology students. We assumed no group differences are observed when irrationality is framed as a human trait.
To strengthen the generalization of the results, we used samples from four cultures that differ in power distance (Hofstede, 2001) : West Asia or southeast Europe (Turkey; Study 1) northwest and southwest Europe (Sweden and Spain), and central Europe (Poland; Study 2). Thus, we assumed Hypothesis 3 (H3) that the effects assumed in H1 and H2 are visible across all four countries, regardless of their levels of power distance.
Comparing the four countries of study, the country with the highest egalitarian approach is Sweden (31st on the power distance index [PDI]), followed by Spain (57th on the PDI), Turkey (66th on the PDI), and Poland (68th on the PDI) (see Hofstede, 2001 ). Thus, it is possible that students in Poland, Turkey, and Spain might manifest more acceptance of the inequality of power than those in Sweden.
For the studies conducted in all four countries, we followed the design in which an ingroup member was always an individual from the participant's own country, and an outgroup member was always a migrant living in the participant's country but came from another country considered to be of lower status compared to the majority, high-status ingroup. (The exception is the Turkish sample in Study 1. We chose to describe an outgroup member as a person declared to be of Kurdish origin, an ethnic minority in Turkey; nevertheless, this group still meets two of the criteria as a low-status, minority outgroup.) As the outgroup was always a migrant or minority group in the studies, we analyzed only the results for the participants who declared they were nationals of the country where the study was conducted, irrespective of their origin and ethnic background. Responses from participants of other nationalities were excluded (e.g., we presented a Kurdish woman as an outgroup member in Study 1 conducted in Turkey, and thus, excluded all responses from Kurdish participants).
To rule out certain possible alternative explanations, we controlled for social desirability and the desire for high self-esteem. In Study 3, we tested whether the tendency to give socially desirable answers and the desire to heighten one's self-esteem were related to the attribution of irrationality to the target persons.
All studies received ethical approval from the Ethics Board of the Middle East Technical University, Ankara (Turkey) or Institute of Psychology University of Gdansk (Poland). In line with accepted procedures, all participants were informed about the general goals of the study, and we obtained the participants' freely given informed consent before they proceeded with the questionnaires. All participants completed an anonymous questionnaire in Turkish (Study 1), Spanish (Study 2), Swedish (Study 2), or Polish (Study 2 and 3). In Studies 1 and 2, convenient samples of psychology students participated in the research; in Study 3, an additional nonpsychology student sample of Polish adults was recruited, to explore whether low SDO individuals exhibit proposed biases. Participants in all studies were free to withdraw from the study at any time.
Study 1
Study 1 was conducted to verify whether participants perceived ingroup members as more irrational than lowstatus outgroup members, especially when no information about the human nature of irrationality was provided.
The between-subjects design was a factorial 2 (target individual: ingroup member vs. outgroup member) × 2 (no framing vs. framing irrationally as a human trait).
Study 1 was conducted in Turkey. The ingroup member was a Turkish woman, whereas the outgroup member was of Kurdish origin. We hypothesized that the presence of irrationality as an important human trait context (the interpretive frame) would moderate the perception of others as more or less irrational beings (attributions of irrational thinking to the in-and outgroup members). That is, we expected an interaction between group membership and framing of irrationality, such that participants would attribute more irrationality to the ingroup member than to the outgroup member when no information about the nature of irrationality was provided. In contrast, when irrationality is presented as a human characteristic, the attribution of irrationality to in-and outgroup members should be similar.
Method Participants
A total of 169 psychology undergraduate students participated in this study. Sixty-five were men, and 104 were women (M age = 21.17; SD = 1.83).
Procedure and Materials
After a short introduction that presented the research as a study on social perception, the participants were provided with a brief description of the target person. Given that subjective language can have within-category meanings (Biernat, 2003) , this description did not include information about behaviors possibly relevant to the rationality of the thinking domain. The target person was introduced as a woman of Turkish (named Berrin) or Kurdish (named Berfin) origin (independent variable), and details about her family life (husband and children), job (salesperson), and hobbies (trips and experiencing nature) were provided, followed by a request to imagine the person. The personal information related to the target person was the same in all experimental conditions. Participants in the no-framing condition were then asked to answer questions about the thinking styles of the target person and her tendency to exhibit rational behaviors. Before this request, participants in the framing condition read a short reminder that people are prone to biased thinking, they exhibit irrational behavior, and being irrational is a natural human trait (independent variable).
We presented the target person as a woman because most psychology students in general are female. We are aware that male participants could perceive a target person as a double outgroup: as a minority member and as a woman. Thus, we conducted separate analyses to establish whether the gender of the participants was linked to the evaluation of the target person (see the results section).
Following the manipulations, the participants were presented a six-item scale of perceived irrational thinking. We constructed the scale based on research on the main cognitive biases that researchers and clinicians (Barriga, Gibbs, Potter, & Liau, 2001 ) have emphasized. The scale included items related to egotistic interpretations and thinking (e.g., "Berrin believes that rules and principles are for others and not for her") and blaming others (e.g., "Berrin believes that if she makes mistakes, it's often because she is hanging out with the wrong people"). These items were selected to test whether the participants suspected the target person manifested behaviors that demonstrate having frequent cognitive biases, rather than eliciting the participants' subjective description of the target person's level of irrationality. We did this to control for the shifting standards phenomena that generally affect stereotypical attribution processes (Biernat, 2003) . The reliability of the scale was good: Cronbach's alpha was .79 (see Table 1 for details). 
Results and Discussion
To verify the predictions, we conducted a 2 (ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (no-framing vs. framing) analysis of variance To disentangle the interaction, we analyzed the simple effects of the group membership within each level of the framing condition. In the no-framing condition, F(1,165) = 12.26, p = .001, η 2 = .07, the outgroup member was perceived as less irrational (M = 2.53, SD = 1.07) than the ingroup member (M = 3.29, SD = 0.96), but this difference was not statistically significant when irrationality was framed as a human trait (M = 3.56, SD = 0.96 and M = 3.67, SD = 0.99 for the out-and ingroups, respectively; F(1,165) = .25, p = .62, η 2 < .01. This result is illustrated in Figure 1 .
As the target person was female, and could have been perceived differently by male and female participants, we also conducted ANOVAs with the participants' gender as covariance. Including gender did not change the results statistically significantly. All main effects were statistically significant (effects of group membership with η 2 = .05, framing condition with η 2 = .11). The effect of gender itself was not statistically significant (p = .053; η 2 = .03). The interaction effect was weaker than without covariance (p = .057; η 2 = .022).
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported by the Study 1 results. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, participants attributed more irrationality to outgroup members than to ingroup members. The main effect of the frame was also statistically significant: Participants overall attributed more irrationality to others in the framing condition than in the no- Attributional Biases of Low-Status Outgroup Members 198 framing condition. However, the main effects were qualified by the interaction between group membership and the framing of irrationality. The pro-low-status outgroup attribution bias emerged only when no information about the nature of irrationality was provided. In contrast, when irrationality was presented as a human characteristic, participants perceived in-and outgroup members similarly in terms of their irrationality. This result provides preliminary support for the assumption that the perception of outgroup members as less irrational than ingroup members is not due to the dehumanization of outgroup members. 
Note. Error bars represent standard deviations (SDs).
We conducted a second study to explore whether the results obtained in Turkey would be replicated in other cultural settings, such as less hierarchy-enhancing settings. We applied a different scale to assess the perceived irrationality of in-and outgroup members to check whether the effect found in Study 1 also emerged when a scale that included items related to a broader array of cognitive biases was used.
Study 2
Study 2 was conducted to check whether the interaction between group membership and framing of attribution of irrationality extends to different cultures, in particular, Spain, Poland, and Sweden. The design in both studies was a factorial between subjects with 2 (ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (no framing vs. framing irrationally as a human trait). As in Study 1, we expected a main effect from group membership, such that participants would attribute more irrationality to ingroup members than to outgroup members. However, this effect should be qualified by the interaction between group membership and the irrationality frame. We expected differences between the attribution of irrationality to in-and outgroup members to be observed when no framing of irrationality occurred; thus, this attribution can be considered automatic. When irrationality is presented as a human characteristic, we predicted no difference in the attributions of irrationality as a function of group membership. 
Method Participants

Procedure and Materials
The procedure adopted in this study was identical to that in Study 1, with different outgroups presented to participants in their respective countries to meet the criteria of having a low-status, minority outgroup. In Spain, the outgroup member was a Moroccan woman; in Sweden, the outgroup member was a Romanian woman; and in Poland, the outgroup member was a Russian woman. Data obtained from participants who were not Spanish, Polish, or Swedish were excluded from the analysis.
To measure perceived irrational thinking, we constructed an extended eight-item scale. Items concerning egoistic thinking and blaming others were retained. We also incorporated items based on the Cognitive Distortions Scale or-nothing thinking (e.g., "Anna often engages in either white or black thinking without seeing the shades of gray"), and labeling (e.g., "Anna often labels people as being of a certain kind without knowing them"). We added items that related to common biases, such as a basic attribution error (e.g., "Anna often thinks that others' setbacks are the result of their incompetence and underestimates the power of situational factors"). This scale had high reliability: Cronbach's alpha was .92, .83, and .89 for Spain, Poland, and Sweden, respectively.
Results and Discussion
To test the predictions, we conducted a 2 (ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (no framing vs. framing) × 3 (country) ANOVA.
All the main effects were statistically significant. The main effect of group membership was statistically significant, 
Attributional Biases of Low-Status Outgroup Members 200
To disentangle the two-way interaction between group membership and framing of irrationality, we analyzed the simple effects of group membership within each level of the framing condition. As expected, in the no-framing condition, F(1,438) = 32.76, p < .001, η 2 = .07, the outgroup was perceived as less irrational (M = 2.74, SD = 1.09
and M = 2.00, SD = 1.05 for the in-and outgroup, respectively), and in the framing condition, F(1,438) = 6.48, p = .011, η 2 = .02, this difference was definitively reduced (M = 2.76, SD = 1.02 and M = 2.46, SD = 1.12 for the inand outgroup, respectively).
As the target person was introduced as a woman, and she could be perceived differently by male and female participants, we conducted ANOVAs with the participants' gender as covariance. With gender included, all the main effects were still statistically significant. The strength of the main effect of gender (η 2 ) was .02 (p = .004).
The interaction effect of Group × Framing was also statistically significant (p = .03 and η 2 = .011).
In addition, we explored the three-way interaction between target group membership and framing for each country.
To do so, we analyzed the simple effects of group membership within each level of the framing condition for each country separately. Under the no-framing condition, psychology students in all three countries saw outgroup members as less irrational than ingroup members. Specifically, the outgroup was perceived as less irrational in 
Results and Discussion
Preliminary Results
Preliminary correlation analyses showed that group-based dominance was related to attributions of irrationality when the target person belonged to an outgroup, regarding individual targets, r(27) = .55, p = .002, and for average members of the target group, r(43) = .56, p < .001. No statistically significant correlation was obtained when the ingroup was evaluated, r(44) = .16, p = .30 when presented with the individual target and r(43) = .10, p = .51 for average members of the target group (see Table 2 ). Note. Results for the individual target person are presented above the diagonal (n = 45 and 28 for the in-and outgroups, respectively) and for the condition target persons as average members of the group below the diagonal (n = 44 for the in-and outgroup target persons). *p < .05. **p < .01.
Role of Group-Based Dominance Orientation
To examine Hypothesis 4 and extend previous findings on attributions of irrationality, we conducted a hierarchical regression. The regression tested for the effects of group-based dominance (unstandardized), target group membership (effect coded: ingroups = −1 vs. outgroups = 1), and the description of the target person, that is, the manner in which the target persons were presented (individual = −1 vs. average members of the group = 1), on attribution of biased and irrational thinking. We controlled for social desirability and desire for higher self-esteem (both variables were unstandardized) and introduced them in the first step of the regression.
As seen in Table 3 , participants who scored higher on group-based dominance were more likely to attribute irrationality to the target person. Target person group membership was a statistically significant predictor as well, with ingroup members seen as more irrational. These effects were qualified by the interaction between group membership and GBD (see Figure 5 ). That is, participants low in dominance perceived outgroup members as less irrational, whereas people high in dominance perceived ingroup members as less irrational. The manner in which the target persons were described was also linked to attribution of irrationality. That is, the evaluation of the average members of the group (vs. the individualized target person) resulted in more irrationality attributed. Neither the effect of SD nor a desire for higher self-esteem was statistically significant. In line with the results from Study 1 and Study 2, the interaction effect showed that people with low group-based dominance orientation (presumably, hierarchy attenuators) present pro-outgroup bias and attribute lower irrationality to outgroup members (than to ingroup ones). To disentangle the interaction effect, we separately calculated the effects of GBD on the attribution of irrationality for in-and outgroup members (PROCESS bootstrapping macro, Model 1; Hayes, 2013) .
In line with the prediction, there was a strong statistically significant conditional effect of GBD on the attribution of irrationality when the outgroup was evaluated, showing that stronger group-based dominance orientation is related to the tendency to attribute more irrational thinking (β = 0.51, SE = 0.11, p < .001; 95% confidence intervals (CIs) [.30, .72] ). The conditional effect of GBD on the attribution of irrationality to the target person's ingroup membership was not statistically significant (β = 0.10, SE = .10, p = .36; 95% CIs [−.11, .30] ). This result confirmed that beliefs in group dominance and a hierarchical social world are more strongly related to the attribution of irrationality to outgroup members than to ingroup members.
Study 3 showed similar effects as in Study 1 and Study 2, but this time among individuals with low scores on the measure for group-based dominance. That is, people who are less ethnocentric and do not want their own group to dominate other groups exhibit similar pro-disadvantaged outgroup bias as psychology undergraduates. Thus, ingroup members are perceived to be more prone to irrational biased thinking than outgroup members. 
General Discussion
In this study, we aimed to show that outgroup members can be perceived as less irrational than ingroup members under specific conditions and by certain individuals. We expected this effect to be evident among hierarchy-attenuating students (e.g., psychology) as they are less inclined to negatively categorize minority groups and are usually less supportive of social hierarchies than students of other majors. We hypothesized that participants would show pro-low-status outgroup bias when they evaluated the irrationality of the outgroup. To check whether this effect is a form of dehumanization, we included a condition in which participants were reminded that irrationality is a human trait. We conducted three studies in different countries varying in power distance levels to examine the universality and cross-cultural generalizability of the findings. The results supported the hypotheses and showed that in a condition without irrationality framed as a human trait, psychology students perceived outgroup members as less irrational than ingroup members. That is, participants showed a pro-outgroup bias for low-status outgroup members and evaluated ingroup members as significantly more irrational than the outgroup ones.
However, when participants were reminded that irrationality is a human trait, the perceived differences between in-and outgroup members were reduced. For Sweden, the difference was still statistically significant, although the reason for this result is not entirely clear. As Sweden is the most egalitarian country among the four countries in this study (Hofstede, 2001) , we assume that the bias toward low-status groups is stronger than in the other three countries and thus, possibly less affected by the manipulation. The second possible explanation is social desirability. Given the hotly debated situation of poor migrants in the Swedish media, the participants may have been reluctant to rate the groups negatively so that the participants did not appear racist. Although we controlled for social desirability in Study 3, we did not conduct a follow-up study in Sweden. However, these explanations are speculative, and further investigation is needed.
Nevertheless, the pattern observed among psychology students was also seen among Polish adults with low group-based dominance orientation, but not among high group-based dominance individuals. It has been wellestablished that individuals in general hold group-serving biases in favor of ingroups (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002; Pronin, 2009) . Group-serving biases act as a strong determinant of intergroup relationships affecting the autonomic evaluations and perceptions of outgroup members. People tend to make more favorable attributions for their ingroups compared to outgroups. However, we showed that this may not be the case among hierarchy-attenuating students and people who do not support group-based dominance. Psychology students may differ from the general population in terms of outgroup attributions because research has revealed that individuals with lower authoritarianism and social dominance orientation and higher humanism are more likely to choose psychology as a major (Dambrun et al., 2002 (Dambrun et al., , 2009 Rubinstein, 2003) .
As low group-based dominance is associated with lower ethnocentrism for high-and low-status groups, those with a low group-dominance orientation may be motivated to avoid ingroup favoritism, may be more concerned with low-status outgroups and show vigilance in making outgroup attributions. Having a strong motivation for attenuating groups' hierarchy and a concern for not discriminating against outgroup members may have driven the participants to spontaneously show a pro-outgroup bias for low-status outgroups. The differences between the framing and no-framing conditions among psychology students may stem from the fact that when reminded that irrationality is a typical human trait, the participants may have realized that attributing irrationality to outgroups does not mean discriminating against them and thus, supported hierarchy and inequality between groups.
Limitations and Future Directions
Overall, the results suggest that pro-low-status outgroup bias is evident among psychology students and low group-dominance participants. Future research could extend this work and compare whether the effects in the present studies are weaker or do not exist among hierarchy-enhancing participants. Moreover, we presented only one study from Poland that controlled for the role of social desirability and the desire for higher self-esteem.
More studies from various cultural contexts are needed to rule out other possible explanations of the effects, particularly those focusing on the role of self-presentation and providing insight in line with societal expectations.
The measure of social desirability was shortened and used in only one culture. A subtler scale might be used in follow-up studies. In addition, the next step in the exploration of this research area could be related to examining whether this pro-low-status outgroup bias extends to other intergroup contexts (e.g., the perception of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals by heterosexuals with low group-based dominance) and whether this bias is related to not only irrationality attribution but also prescription of other traits considered positive and worth having.
